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 Economics, Entitlements, and Social Issues:
 Voter Choice in the 1996
 Presidential Election
 R. Michael Alvarez, California Institute of Technology
 Jonathan Nagler, University of California, Riverside
 Theory: Contemporary theories of presidential election outcomes, especially the eco-
 nomic voting and spatial issue voting models, are used to examine voter choice in the
 1996 presidential election.
 Hypotheses: First, we look at the effects of voter perceptions of the national economy
 on voter support for Clinton. Second, we look at the effects of candidate and voter posi-
 tions on ideology and on a number of issues. Last, we examine whether voters' views on
 other issues-social issues such as abortion as well as issues revolving around entitle-
 ments and taxation that were emphasized by the campaigns-played significant roles in
 this election.
 Methods: We employ multinomial probit analysis of the 1996 National Election Studies
 data and simulations based on counterfactual scenarios which are based on different per-
 ceptions of macroeconomic conditions and issue platforms of candidates.
 Results: The effects of economic perceptions are much greater than the effects of voter
 issue positions on the election outcome. This behavior by voters leaves presidents sub-
 stantial room to shirk on policy issues. But, some social issues, namely abortion, play a
 role in determining the election outcome. The presence of a third centrist candidate lim-
 ited the ability of other candidates to improve their vote shares by moving in the issue
 space.
 In general, both scholarly and popular discussions of presidential election
 outcomes have focused on three factors: the state of the economy, the posi-
 tions of voters and candidates on issues, and the ability of candidates to con-
 duct effective campaigns for office. In this paper we examine how these dif-
 ferent factors account for the outcome of the 1996 presidential election. In
 This is one of many joint papers by the authors on multiparty elections; the ordering of their names
 reflects alphabetic convention. We thank Alan Abramowitz, Tara Butterfield, and Garrett Glasgow
 for their comments. A previous version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the
 American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August, 1997. This work was supported
 by National Science Foundation grants SBR-9709327 to Alvarez and SBR-9413939 and SBR-
 9709214 to Nagler. Comments may be directed to the authors at: DHSS 228-77, California Institute
 of Technology, Pasadena, Ca 91125, rma@crunch.caltech.edu, and Department of Political Science,
 University of California, Riverside, Ca 92521-0118, nagler@wizard.ucr.edu, respectively. The
 datasets and computer code used to produce the results reported here can be obtained from the
 ICPSR article replication archive or from http://www.hss.caltech.edu/-rma/research.html.
 American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42, No. 4, October 1998, Pp. 1349-1363 ( 1998 by the
 Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System
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 turn, this will enhance our general understanding of how voters make their
 decisions in American presidential elections.
 Recently, interest has focused on the importance of the national
 economy as a factor in accounting for both the success of three Republican
 presidential candidates during the 1980s as well as Bill Clinton's first vic-
 tory in 1992 (Alvarez and Nagler 1995; Fiorina 1981; Kiewiet 1983; Markus
 1988; Rosenstone 1983; Tufte 1978). But many in academic and popular
 circles have pointed to a number of noneconomic factors as important fea-
 tures of presidential politics. For example, in recent years social issues may
 have risen in importance as factors in presidential politics, most especially
 the issues of abortion and voter anger with Washington and the federal gov-
 ernment. Contrasting the social issues, in the 1990s the Democrats tried to
 make entitlement programs an issue by arguing to voters that Republicans
 would eliminate or severely curtail Medicare and Social Security. In addi-
 tion to these issues, the more general notions of liberal and conservative ide-
 ology have been seen as important issues in recent presidential campaigns
 since Ronald Reagan ran on an ideological position distinct from his oppo-
 nent. Since then presidential elections have featured Bush's attacks on
 Dukakis's liberalism in the 1988 campaign and Clinton's more recent "New
 Democratic" ideology. So strong reasons exist to believe that both issues and
 ideology were important features of the 1996 presidential election (Alvarez
 1997; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1983, 1987, 1990, 1994; Carmines
 and Stimson 1980; Jackson 1975; Key 1966; Page and Brody 1972; Pomper
 1972).
 While it is important to understand the relative impact of economics, is-
 sues, and ideology in particular presidential elections, having a general
 sense of which factors tend to matter most in voter decision rules can pro-
 duce normative conclusions about the quality of voter decisions and whether
 politicians face serious constraints while in office. Judgments about presi-
 dential candidates based on retrospective economic concerns might be seen
 as employing objective and tangible information. However, if presidents
 have little control over short-term macroeconomic performance, retrospec-
 tive economic evaluations might be poor decision criteria for voters to em-
 ploy in electoral choice if their goal is to insure outcomes they desire. Thus,
 if voters are using economic criteria and not issue or ideological information
 in their decisions, candidates might be allowed much more flexibility in
 their future policymaking activities than voters would like them to have.
 In this paper we examine three sets of explanations for the outcome of
 the 1996 presidential election campaign. First, we look at the effects of voter
 perceptions of the national economy on voter support for Clinton. Second
 we look at the effects of candidate and voter issue and ideological positions
 on support for the candidates. Third, we seek to understand whether voters'
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 preferences on other issues-social issues such as abortion as well as issues
 revolving around entitlements and taxation that were the focus of indirect
 and direct campaign strategies-played significant roles in this election.
 Thus this work extends the work of Alvarez and Nagler (1995) and enriches
 it with analysis of a more comprehensive set of issues. In the end, we are
 able to pull together each of these different sets of explanations into a con-
 sistent analysis of the 1996 presidential election which shows why Clinton
 won this race and why Dole and Perot fell so far from electoral victory. This
 allows us to better understand the relative importance of economics and is-
 sues in determining presidential election outcomes.
 1. MODELING THE 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
 To test these different explanations requires a multivariate methodology
 where we can determine the relative effects of respondent characteristics and
 candidate positions on issues in a three-candidate election. We chose the
 multivariate model that imposes the fewest restrictions; we use the multi-
 nomial probit model to produce multivariate estimates of the relative effects
 of different factors on vote choice in the 1996 presidential election (Alvarez
 and Nagler 1995, 1998). We use the same type of multinomial probit speci-
 fication as in our analysis of the 1992 presidential election.
 The data we use are from the 1996 American National Election Study
 (Rosenstone, Kinder, and Miller 1997). In the multinomial probit specifica-
 tion, we estimate one coefficient for each alternative-specific characteristic.
 Thus we estimate only one parameter for each of the issue and ideological
 distance measures in our model.' The measure of ideological or issue dis-
 tance is the squared difference between the respondent's self placement on
 the respective NES seven point issue or ideological scale and the candidate's
 mean placement on the same scale by all respondents.2 But for individual
 characteristics, we estimate ;(J - 1) coefficients for each characteristic, with
 'In earlier work, we only operationalized ideological distance between the three candidates
 and each voter since there were no issue placement questions for Perot in the 1992 study (Alvarez
 and Nagler 1995). In the 1996 data, however, voters in the first two (of four) sample replicates were
 asked to place Perot on six seven-point issue scales (government services, defense spending, govern-
 ment responsibility for jobs, aid to blacks, crime reduction, and environmental regulation); the entire
 sample was asked to place Perot on the ideological scale. Thus we model a number of different can-
 didate-specific variables. We did estimate a multinomial probit specification which includes only the
 ideological distance between the voter and each candidate, exactly replicating our analysis of the
 1992 election data; we also estimated a model which included only the issue distance parameters
 and not ideology but we do not present that here. The results from these other models are substan-
 tively equivalent to those presented here and are available from the authors.
 2Since the issue placement questions for Perot were asked only to survey voters in the first two
 sample replicates, when we calculate the position of Perot on each of these issues we use only vot-
 ers from these first two sample replicates.
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 J being the number of choices in the model. Since there are only three
 choices in the model we present, we will estimate two such vectors of coef-
 ficients. One of these sets of coefficients gives the effect of a particular indi-
 vidual characteristic on the relative likelihood of choosing Clinton over
 Perot; the other set of coefficients gives the effect of an individual character-
 istic on the relative likelihood of choosing Dole over Perot.3
 We include measures of the voter's opinion of the change in their per-
 sonal finances over the past year and their opinion on the change in the na-
 tional economy during that same time. Both of these measures are coded
 with positive evaluations as the high category. We include measures for
 opinions on whether both welfare and social security should be increased,
 kept the same, or cut (both variables were coded with the conservative an-
 swers the higher values). We also include opinions on the Dole 15 percent
 tax cut (a binary variable coded such that agreement with Dole on this issue
 was the high category). Additionally we include the respondent's opinion of
 government health insurance (conservative answers were coded high on the
 seven point scale). We measure voters' opinions about abortion policy by us-
 ing responses from a question which asked voters which of four abortion
 options best represented their beliefs on abortion policy, with pro-choice
 coded high.
 Finally, we included a series of measures for the individual characteris-
 tics which might have influenced voter choice in the 1996 presidential elec-
 tion. We have dummy variables for Republican and Democratic identification
 (with independents being the baseline category), measures for the respon-
 dent's educational attainment (years of schooling), gender (females were
 coded high), age (three dummy variables), and region (dummy variables for
 West, South, and East).
 1.1 Multinomial Probit Estimates of the 1996 Election
 In Table 1 we present the multinomial probit estimates. The parameter
 estimates in the left column give the coefficients which express the effect of
 each individual characteristic on the likelihood of the respondent voting for
 Clinton relative to the likelihood of voting for Perot. The right column gives
 coefficients for the effect of each individual characteristic on the relative
 likelihood of choosing Dole versus choosing Perot. The center column of
 estimates gives the coefficient estimates for the candidate-specific ideologi-
 cal or issue distances.
 3We choose this particular normalization since it is identical to the normalization in our earlier
 paper on the 1992 election (Alvarez and Nagler 1995). We present results which estimate two of the
 three free error covariance elements, consistent with the standard results in the literature on the iden-
 tification of these model parameters (Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Bolduc 1992; Bunch 1991; Keane
 1992).
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 Table 1. Multinomial Probit Coefficients,
 Issue and Ideological Distance Model
 Perot Coefficients Normalized to Zero
 Independent Coefficients for
 Variables Clinton Dole
 Gov't services -.05*
 .02
 Defense spending -.04
 .06
 Gov't jobs -.02
 .02
 Aid to blacks -.01
 .02
 Crime reduction .00
 .02
 Environmental regulation -.06*
 .03
 Ideology -.09*
 .03
 Constant -2.78* -1.80**
 1.28 1.27
 Personal Finance Improved .09 .16
 .13 .18
 National Economy Improved .57* -.21
 .28 .23
 Increase Welfare -.11 -.45*
 .17 .25
 Increase Social Security .23 .03
 .19 .20
 Education 1.20 2.56*
 1.02 1.40
 Pro-Choice Abortion .11 -.32*
 .15 .19
 Approve 15 percent Tax Cut .11 .49**
 .31 .35
 Oppose Govt Health Ins .05 .19*
 .08 .11
 Democrat 1.16* -.98**
 .65 .61
 Republican .51 .99**
 .56 .70
 Female .11 .33
 .20 .26
 Age: 18-29 -.80* -.97**
 .48 .62
 Age: 30-44 -1.06* -.65**
 .38 .48
 (continued on next page)
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 Table 1. Multinomial Probit Coefficients,
 Issue and Ideological Distance Model (continued)
 Perot Coefficients Normalized to Zero
 Independent Coefficients for
 Variables Clinton Dole
 Age: 45-59 -.33 -.28
 .28 .33
 West .40** .10
 .29 .34
 South .27 -.13
 .24 .28
 East .22 -.44
 .30 .36
 (DP .02
 1.04
 '5CP .42
 .45
 Number of Observations 687
 Log Likelihood -309.85
 *Significant at p = .05 level (1-tailed test)
 **Significant at p = .10 level (1-tailed test).
 The results in Table 1 are similar to our analysis of the 1992 election.4
 Ideological distance had a strong effect on candidate choice and indicates
 that voters were less likely to support candidates who were further from them
 ideologically, all other things being equal. Adding the issue distance vari-
 ables improves our ability to understand the outcome of the 1996 presidential
 election. We found two statistically significant relationships: the further re-
 spondents' view of support for government services and environmental regu-
 4This model fits the data quite well; it produces a predicted three candidate outcome of 48.8
 percent for Clinton, 41.4 percent for Dole and 9.9 percent for Perot; the actual estimation sample had
 a three candidate split of 46.7 percent for Clinton, 44.8 percent for Dole, and 8.4 percent for Perot.
 We correctly classified 82.2 percent of the voters in our sample. In this model (Table 1), we see that
 the estimated error correlations are statistically insignificant. In the model we estimated including
 only ideology, one error correlation parameter (6cp) was statistically significant at the p = .05 level
 (one-tailed test). This indicates that the "independence of irrelevant alternatives" assumption may be
 violated in this case (Alvarez and Nagler 1998). There are two possible explanations for these error
 correlation estimates across the two multinomial probit models. One explanation could be that we
 have a better specification when we include issues and ideology in our multinomial probit model;
 possibly the information contained in the six issue distance parameters leads to the significant error
 correlation in the ideology-only model, information excluded from this model. The second explana-
 tion centers on the fact that we lose 160 cases when we include the six issues in our multinomial
 probit model; the loss of efficiency associated with these missing cases in the second model might
 produce the larger standard error associated with the estimate of Gcp in Table 1.
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 lation were from the candidate's views, the less likely they were to support
 the candidate. As to the other issue-based predictors of support for Clinton
 relative to Perot, only Democratic partisanship and the perceptions of voters
 about the state of the national economy are significantly related to Clinton
 support relative to Perot. The coefficients on social security, abortion, and the
 tax cut are not significant; thus voters did not necessarily use these issues to
 distinguish between Clinton and Perot. However, looking at the coefflcients
 for Dole relative to Perot, we see that voters did use several of these issues in
 making their choice among the candidates. Support for welfare cuts, pro-life
 beliefs, and support for private sector provision of health care are significant
 predictors of support for Dole relative to Perot. In addition to partisanship,
 the estimated impact of the 15 percent tax cut is statistically significant (sig-
 nificance here is at the 90 percent level, with a one-tailed test).
 A voter's gender has no significant effect on vote choice once we con-
 trol for the issues and demographic variables included in our model. This is
 consistent with recent work showing that the gender gap can be explained by
 issue positions of voters and candidates, economic perceptions, and parti-
 sanship (for discussion of this literature see Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler
 1998).
 Thus the multinomial probit results allow us to assess the different ex-
 planations for the 1996 presidential election. We find support for the propo-
 sition that the national economy had a strong effect on voter choice as well
 as the idea that relative spatial location of voters and candidates on ideology
 and on selected issues (government services and environmental regulation)
 were significant predictors of candidate support. Finally, we see that voters'
 positions on a number of other issues-changes in entitlement policy, in fed-
 eral government taxation, and abortion policy-were themselves significant
 predictors of vote choice.
 1.2 The Magnitude of the Effects of the Independent Variables
 Since these estimated effects in the multinomial probit model translate
 into individual probabilities of candidate support in a complex and nonlinear
 manner, we transform these coefficient estimates into probabilities to aid our
 interpretation of the relative magnitude of each type of effect on this election.
 Thus, we present "first difference" estimates in Table 2. We first set all of the
 independent variables to their sample mode or mean values.5 Then for each
 5Each of the issue and ideological distance variables were set to their sample mean values. We
 used more substantively plausible values for the other demographic and issue preference variables;
 the hypothetical respondent our calculations are based on was male, older than 60, lived in the south,
 had a high school education, was politically independent, thought that welfare should be cut but
 social security should remain constant, saw the national economy as better but their personal finances
 as unchanged, did not support the Dole 15 percent tax cut, was middle-of-the road on government
 support for health care, and thought that abortion should be permitted only in limited situations.
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 Table 2. Effects of Economics and Issues in 1996
 Probability of Voting for
 Clinton Dole Perot
 Personal finance
 Better .49 .39 .11
 Worse .50 .34 .16
 Difference .01 .05 -.05
 National economy
 Better .49 .37 .14
 Worse .11 .68 .21
 Difference .38 -.31 -.07
 Social security
 Increase .56 .33 .11
 Cut .42 .41 .17
 Difference .14 -.08 -.06
 Welfare
 Increase .57 .19 .24
 Cut .49 .37 .14
 Difference .08 -.18 .10
 Abortion
 Pro-choice .59 .27 .14
 Pro-life .29 .60 .11
 Difference .30 -.33 .03
 Baseline Probability .49 .37 .14
 Estimated probabilities were calculated with the other variables set to their mean or mode value.
 of the independent variables of interest, we compute predicted probabilities
 of a voter choosing Clinton, Dole, and Perot for different values of specific
 independent variables. We first give the estimated probability for the high
 value of the variable, followed by the predicted probability of candidate sup-
 port for the low value of the independent variable. The last entry for each spe-
 cific independent variable is the difference between these two probability es-
 timates, measure of the effect of changes in the variable.
 The first two entries in Table 2 show how important the state of the na-
 tional economy was in determining voter choice in 1996 than were percep-
 tions of finances. Changes in a respondent's perception of their personal fi-
 nances produced slight changes in the probability that the hypothetical voter
 would support each of the candidates. However, changes in perceptions of
 the national economy produced large changes in both Clinton and Dole sup-
 port. The hypothetical voter was 38 percent more likely to support Clinton if
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 they saw the national economy as better rather than worse; the hypothetical
 voter was 31 percent more likely to support Dole if they saw the national
 economy as worse, not better.
 Next, we see from Table 2 that opinions on cuts in both entitlement pro-
 grams and abortion had strong impacts on candidate support. A voter who
 wanted to increase either program would be 14 or 8 percent (on Social Secu-
 rity and welfare, respectively) more likely to support Clinton. But a voter
 who wanted to cut either program was more likely to support Dole than a
 voter who wanted increases in either program (8 and 18 percent more likely
 for Social Security and welfare, respectively). These two issues had less of
 an impact on voting for Perot, since those wanting cuts in Social Security
 were more likely to vote for Perot than those wanting increases in that en-
 titlement program; voters advocating increases in welfare programs were .10
 percent more likely to vote for Perot than those desiring welfare program
 cuts.
 Pro-choice beliefs made our hypothetical voter 30 percent more likely
 to support Clinton than pro-life voters. Pro-life beliefs made voters 33 per-
 cent more likely to support Dole than pro-choice voters. Abortion again
 played a crucial role in the election with the two major party candidates of-
 fering distinct choices.
 2. EFFECTS OF CANDIDATE SPATIAL LOCATIONS
 The results presented in Table'2 demonstrated that voters' views of the
 issues played a strong role in determining voter choice in the 1996 presiden-
 tial election. Here we pursue a different question about the importance of is-
 sues in this election by focusing on where the candidates were located on
 the six issues in our analysis and ideology. We also determine what each
 candidate's ideal location on each issue and ideology would have been.
 To determine the effects of candidate behavior with regard to issue and
 ideological positioning, we simulate the effect of each candidate moving
 across the issue or ideological space, holding the positions of the other two
 candidates fixed. This is identical to the procedure we used in our analysis of
 the 1992 election (Alvarez and Nagler 1995). In this simulation, we compute
 the probability of each respondent voting for each of the three candidates as
 we move the candidate of interest across the issue or ideological space, from
 1 to 7, by increments of .02. We then aggregate the estimated probabilities
 from all voters for each candidate at each possible position. This gives us
 estimated vote shares at each possible position.
 We use the optimal placements we calculated using the procedure just
 described to determine what the maximal change in vote share would have
 been if any one of these candidates could have moved to their optimal
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 Table 3. Estimated Vote Shares with Candidates at Optimal Locations
 Three Candidate Vote Shares
 Clinton Dole Perot
 Vote Shares at Actual Positions 48.7 41.4 9.9
 Clinton at Optimal Position 53.7 37.8 8.3
 Dole at Optimal Position 46.8 43.8 9.3
 Perot at Optimal Position 44.9 40.1 15.1
 Two Candidate Vote Shares
 Clinton Dole
 Vote Shares at Actual Positions 52.4 47.6
 Clinton at Optimal Position 57.1 42.9
 Dole at Optimal Position 50.3 47.6
 Cell entries are predicted vote shares for each candidate, if the candidate listed at the left moved to
 his optimal position on ideology and all six issues with the other candidates fixed.
 position on ideology and all six issues, ceteris paribus.6 In Table 3 we see
 there could have been some reasonably large changes in candidate vote
 shares if each of the candidates had moved to their optimal positions, hold-
 ing the other candidates constant. Clinton, for example, could have in-
 creased his vote share a full 5 percent by simultaneously moving to his op-
 timal position on all issues and ideology. Also, notice that Dole would have
 increased his vote share by almost 3 percent by moving to his optimal loca-
 tion. The biggest increase is seen for Perot, whose vote share would have
 jumped over 5 percent had he been able to simultaneously move to his op-
 timal ideological and issue location. Under each hypothetical scenario we
 present, however, Clinton remains the winner.
 This evidence thus leads us to conclude that the election was not deter-
 mined by the ideological and issue position of the candidates. We found
 little support for the idea that any of the candidates were very far from their
 ideal positions. And when we moved each candidate to their ideological and
 issue optimal placements simultaneously, we did see some change in their
 vote shares, but not enough to significantly alter the outcome of the 1996
 presidential election.
 In 1992, when Perot received roughly 20 percent of the popular vote,
 whether his presence in the election campaign hurt Bush more than Clinton
 6We performed similar analyses for all of the issues and ideology moving the candidates on
 each issue alone. In these results we see that movement on any one issue would not have apprecia-
 bly helped any of the candidates. These results are available from the authors.
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 was an important question. We showed that Perot drew support from both
 Bush and Clinton almost equally, taking slightly more votes from Bush than
 from Clinton (Alvarez and Nagler 1995). We concluded from this that de-
 spite the fact that Perot's presence slightly increased Clinton's victory mar-
 gin, Bush would still have lost the 1992 election. In 1996 Perot captured
 about 10 percent of all the votes cast, indicating that he was still a consider-
 able force on the national political scene. If these voters had not been pre-
 sented with a choice of Perot and had still turned out to vote, who would
 they have cast ballots for? And perhaps more importantly, could Dole have
 beaten Clinton in a Perot-free political environment?
 Our multinomial probit model gives us one way to try to answer this
 question. We exclude Perot from the choice set by simply computing the
 two-party vote share under the assumption that each voter would cast their
 vote for Clinton or Dole, dependent upon the candidate for which they had
 the greatest utility. Using this approach, we estimate a two party vote break-
 down of 52.4 percent for Clinton and 47.6 percent for Dole, a margin of just
 under five percent. In Table 3 we place Clinton at his optimal position on
 each of the seven issues and-ideology-in a two-candidate race-and com-
 pute the vote shares of Clinton and Dole. We then do the same for Dole. If
 Clinton were to move to his optimal position on ideology and the issues si-
 multaneously, he could have swept to a large victory (57.1 percent to 42.9
 percent) in a two-candidate race.
 3. EFFECTS OF THE ECONOMY
 We now turn to the other major factor which influenced voter behavior
 in the 1996 election-economic perceptions. Our methodology gives us the
 ability to examine another important counterfactual question, following the
 sort of questions we asked about the 1992 presidential election (Alvarez and
 Nagler 1995), in particular, what if the state of the national economy had
 been significantly different in 1996? Would Dole have been able to win the
 1996 election if voters perceived the national economy and their own per-
 sonal finances in the same negative light in 1996 as they had in 1992?
 At first blush, what is interesting about the aggregate distributions of
 opinions about personal finances in 1996 is that they were remarkably simi-
 lar to those in 1988. While the distribution of opinions about changes in per-
 sonal finance are virtually identical in 1988 and 1996 (with 42 percent and
 44 percent said their personal finances were better in each year, and 25 per-
 cent saying they got worse in each year), the assessments of the national
 economy were, on balance, slightly more favorable in 1996 than in 1988
 (with 40 percent saying the national economy was better in 1996 and only
 19 percent saying the same in 1988). But what actually is most important to
 observe about the perceived state of the economy is how different 1992 was
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 relative to both 1988 and 1996. There is no question that the electorate was
 in a sour economic mood in 1992- only 5 percent thought the economy had
 become better, a large part of the story behind Bush's loss (Alvarez and
 Nagler 1995). The opinions regarding change in personal finances are also
 more negative in 1992 than in either of the other years (30 percent believed
 their personal finances were better in 1992). The perceptions of the national
 economy, however, were dramatically different in 1992 than in 1996 or
 1988: a full 72 percent of American voters believed the national economy
 had grown worse during the last year of Bush's administration.
 While we have thus found in our multinomial probit results that the na-
 tional economy had a strong effect in returning Clinton to office in 1996,
 what would have happened if the economy had been performing poorly in
 the year leading up to this election? More specifically, what might the results
 have been if the election in 1996 were held with voters possessing the same
 economic perceptions which helped to push Clinton to victory in 1992? To
 answer this question, we provide counterfactual estimates of candidate vote
 shares under three different scenarios in Table 4. There, we simulate these
 hypothetical election outcomes by randomly reassigning opinions of the
 economy to the 1996 voters so that the aggregate distributions of opinions
 regarding economy matched the distributions of opinion about the economy
 held by voters in 1992. Such a simulation allows us to compute the probabil-
 ity of voting for each candidate using these hypothetical values for the eco-
 nomic perception variables and the voters' actual values for all of the other
 variables.
 In Table 4 we see that if voters had seen their personal finances in 1996
 the same as voters had in 1992 it would not have changed the election out-
 come. In the third row of this table, however, it is clear that had the national
 economy been seen by voters as being as bad in 1996 as it was in 1992,
 Clinton would have lost this election by a large margin. Not only could
 Clinton have lost to Dole by a considerable margin (about ten percentage
 points), Perot's vote share would have risen to just under 15 percent. We
 also present in Table 4 the same counterfactual simulation, but with Perot
 on the sidelines: were the national economy perceived to be as bad in 1996
 as it was perceived in 1992, Dole would have easily won a two-candidate
 1996 presidential election. Thus, the conclusion is inescapable; just as the
 weak economy in 1992 doomed the incumbent president to retirement, the
 strong economy in 1996 granted another incumbent president four more
 years in office.
 4. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
 There are at least three policy issues or areas outside of economic per-
 formance that may have helped reelect Clinton in 1996. First, to the extent
 that he had an issue based campaign, it is clear that a Democratic tactic was
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 Table 4. Comparative Economic Opinion Effects, 1992-96
 Three Candidate Vote Shares
 Distribution of Respondents'
 Perceptions of Economy Clinton Dole Perot
 1996 Baseline 48.7 41.4 9.9
 1992 Personal finances only 48.6 41.2 10.1
 1992 National economy only 37.7 47.8 14.5
 1992 Personal finances and
 national economy 37.4 47.7 14.9
 Two Candidate Vote Shares
 Clinton Dole
 1996 Baseline 52.4 47.6
 1992 Personal finances only 52.6 47.4
 1992 National economy only 46.6 53.4
 1992 Personal finances and
 national economy 46.4 53.6
 Cell entries are estimated vote shares for each candidate if distribution of respondents' perceptions
 of the economy matched the distribution of respondents' perceptions of the economy in 1992.
 to scare voters into thinking that the Republicans would destroy Social Se-
 curity. We have no measure of how effective the campaign tactic was in con-
 vincing voters of the distinction between the candidates on the issue, but our
 results fail to show that voters' views on Social Security had any statistically
 significant impact on their probability of voting for Clinton-despite the
 predictable support for Clinton over Dole when we examine the vote choice
 of voters supporting social security in a bivariate comparison.
 Second, Clinton ran as a "New Democrat" in 1992 and attempted to
 sharpen that image for the 1996 race by signing the welfare bill. While
 Clinton could not have moved arbitrarily far to the left on the ideological
 scale and still won the election, he could have moved quite a bit to the left.
 Based on voters' perception of Clinton's position on the ideological scale
 that he never really convinced the voters that he was a "New Democrat," vot-
 ers perceived Clinton to be just as liberal in 1996 as they had in 1992, which
 ironically makes Clinton as much a liberal in the eyes of voters as Dukakis
 was in 1988.7
 Third, abortion was again a crucial issue distinguishing the Republican
 and Democratic candidates. A voter's position on abortion was also a major
 71n 1988, the electorate's mean placement of Dukakis on the NES ideological scale was 3.24.
 Clinton's placement on the NES scale was 3.19 in 1992, 3.09 in 1994, and 3.15 in 1996. The elec-
 torate, therefore, did not see Clinton to be any more moderate than Dukakis, which casts consider-
 able doubt on the electoral impact of Clinton's "New Democrat" mantle (Alvarez and Nagler 1995).
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 determinant of how he or she voted. Thus the emergence of the religious
 right as a force in Republican primary politics has clearly had an impact on
 presidential elections as the likelihood of the Republicans nominating a can-
 didate who is pro-choice is slim: they will continue to send out presidential
 nominees holding the minority view on a divisive issue. Our analysis has
 shown that just as in 1992, the abortion position taken by the Republican
 presidential candidates harms their chances for general election victory.
 But, simply put, again it was the economy, stupid. The overwhelming
 impact of the economy in 1992 was not just a fluke, nor was it simply a
 byproduct of the particularly poor economic circumstances. In 1996 the
 election was contested under economic circumstances very favorable to the
 incumbent, and voters again relied heavily on their economic perceptions in
 choosing for whom to cast their votes. Four years into his presidency Clin-
 ton had no major legislative victories to peddle; in fact, he had been defeated
 on the centerpiece of his legislative program-health care reform. In office,
 Clinton had started off pursuing an unpopular proposal on gays in the mili-
 tary, lurched into his health-care defeat, then presided over his party's losing
 the House for the first time in 40 years, which led to a welfare bill that most
 people felt he acceded to simply for political expediency. Yet Clinton was
 still able to easily retain his office.
 The dominance of economic perceptions over issues has interesting nor-
 mative implications for politics. The retrospective model of voting has sug-
 gested that voters reward or punish incumbents for economic performance
 and that this is a good thing since economic performance is observable and
 tangible. However, if incumbents have little control over short-term eco-
 nomic performance, voters are choosing candidates essentially at random.
 This suggests candidates have tremendous freedom to shirk in the policy ar-
 eas over which they do exert considerable influence. If the economy is good
 the incumbent will be retained in office. If the economy is bad, having all the
 correct positions on the issues may not be sufficient to retain office. Thus,
 when voters use retrospective evaluations of national economic performance
 as their primary decision criteria in presidential elections, they might be los-
 ing their ability to insure that they eventually achieve the noneconomic
 policy outcomes they desire.
 We temper this conclusion with another inference we can draw from
 our analysis. We have shown that Dole's ability to influence his vote-share
 by changing his position on the issues was severely limited by the presence
 of a third candidate (Ross Perot) suggesting that in a "crowded issue space"
 candidates have little room to maneuver for increased votes. Examining
 how this shapes politics in the multiparty democracies of Europe relative to
 the usual two-party politics of the United States is a crucial area of future
 research.
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